Cyberqp MCP Server

CyberQP MCP Server

MCP server for CyberQP's (formerly QuickPass Cybersecurity) privileged access management (PAM) API - customer/account metadata, the tenant event log, and JIT (Just-In-Time) account status/policy visibility, for AI assistants and the WYRE Conduit gateway.

Authentication

CyberQP authenticates with OAuth2 authorization_code flow (offline_access scope, refresh_token-backed) - not client_credentials. This connector never performs the OAuth dance itself: the WYRE Conduit gateway owns the authorize/exchange/refresh legs, and this server only ever receives a live bearer access token, sent as Authorization: Bearer <token> to CyberQP's API. In gateway mode the token arrives per-request via the X-CyberQP-Access-Token header; in local/stdio mode it's read once from CYBERQP_ACCESS_TOKEN.

Configuration

Copy .env.example and set the variables below. The stdio transport reads CYBERQP_ACCESS_TOKEN and does not use CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET.

/health stays unauthenticated and does not read credentials.

HTTP authentication

With MCP_TRANSPORT=http and CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET set, every /mcp request must include X-Gateway-S2S:

t=<unix seconds>,v1=<hex hmac-sha256>

v1 is the lowercase hex HMAC-SHA256 of the ASCII message t=<unix seconds>, keyed by CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET. The timestamp must be within 300 seconds of the server clock. A missing or invalid header returns 401 before any vendor credential is read. The secret is never written to logs or error bodies.

In AUTH_MODE=gateway, /mcp also requires X-CyberQP-Access-Token. That header is the only credential source for the request. A missing token returns 401. The server does not fall back to CYBERQP_ACCESS_TOKEN in the process environment.

X-Gateway-S2S: t=1710000000,v1=<hmac-sha256 of "t=1710000000">
X-CyberQP-Access-Token: <live bearer token>

Single-tenant HTTP (AUTH_MODE=env) still requires a valid X-Gateway-S2S header. The access token then comes from CYBERQP_ACCESS_TOKEN.

Request limits

• HTTP request bodies are capped at 256 KiB (262144 bytes). After the X-Gateway-S2S check (and, in AUTH_MODE=gateway, the X-CyberQP-Access-Token presence check) passes, a Content-Length above the cap returns 413 with a JSON-RPC error; bodies without Content-Length are capped by the MCP SDK transport. Unauthenticated requests still get 401 first.
• tools/call arguments are capped at 10,000 elements (every array item and object key at any depth). Larger inputs return an isError tool result with a fixed message (the tool name is not echoed) and are never dispatched.

These limits address CVE-2026-111768 / GHSA-46jr-4wx8-v453 (memory exhaustion during validation) and GHSA-f897-62hf-6gxq (no request body / batch cap).

Tools

Customers

• cyberqp_list_customers - list customers visible to the authenticated technician, filterable by directory type and name.
• cyberqp_get_customer_accounts - list account metadata (id, username, type, status) for a customer.
• cyberqp_get_customer_accounts_count - get per-account-type counts for a customer.

Events

• cyberqp_get_events - get the tenant's event log, filterable by customer, account, event type, status, and date range.
• cyberqp_get_event_types - get the full set of event-type values.

Tenant

• cyberqp_get_tenant_company_data - get the authenticated tenant's own company profile.

JIT (Just-In-Time) - status and policy only

• cyberqp_get_jit_policies - get the configured JIT policy (approval requirements, max duration) for a customer + account type.
• cyberqp_get_customer_jit_status - get JIT account status for a specific customer.
• cyberqp_check_jit_account_exists - check whether a JIT account exists for a customer + directory type.
• cyberqp_get_tenant_jit_status - get JIT account status across the entire tenant.

Scope

This is a deliberately narrow, read-only, non-credential-exposing v1 surface. CyberQP is a PAM product - several of its real endpoints return live plaintext passwords and OTP codes, or mutate/provision privileged access. None of those are implemented here, by design, not by oversight:

Hard-excluded (credential-exposing) - never implemented:

• GET /api/v1/account/{accountId}/password (AccountController_getAccountPassword_v1)
• GET /api/v1/jit/customer/{customerId}/account/{accountId}/password (JitController_getJitAccountPassword_v1)
• GET /api/v1/jit/customer/{customerId}/account/{accountId}/otp (JitController_getJitAccountOTP_v1)
• POST /api/v1/jit/customer/{customerId}/account/{accountId}/otp (JitController_saveJitAccountOtpSecret_v1)
• DELETE /api/v1/jit/customer/{customerId}/account/{accountId}/otp (JitController_deleteJitAccountOtpSecret_v1)

Hard-excluded (provisioning/mutation) - never implemented:

• PATCH /api/v1/jit/customer/{customerId}/account/{accountId}/enable (JitController_enableJitAccount_v1)
• PATCH /api/v1/jit/customer/{customerId}/account/{accountId}/disable (JitController_disableJitAccount_v1)
• DELETE /api/v1/jit/customer/{customerId}/account/{accountId} (JitController_deleteJitAccount_v1)
• POST /api/v1/jit/customer/{customerId}/account (JitController_createJitAccount_v1)

Out of v1 scope (not credential/provisioning, just not part of this connector's metadata-visibility surface - could be added later as a deliberate follow-up):

• GET /api/v1/customers/installer (CustomerController_downloadAgent_v1) - returns a binary installer, not structured data.
• GET /api/v1/tenants/install-token (TenantController_getInstallToken_v1) - returns an installation token.
• GET /api/v1/auth/login, GET /api/v1/auth/status, POST /api/v1/auth/refresh-token, POST /api/v1/auth/revoke-token, POST /api/v1/auth/notification-engine-token - OAuth/session plumbing the gateway already owns, not tool-shaped.
• POST /api/v1/event (EventController_processGenericEvent_v1) - a write.
• POST /api/v1/identity-verification/self-serve-notification (IdentityVerificationController_triggerSelfServePushIdentityVerification_v1) - a write/notification trigger.

They can be added as a follow-up if there's demand, after a deliberate scope decision - not by default.

Development

npm install
npm run build
npm test
npm run lint   # tsc --noEmit

Docker

The image listens on 0.0.0.0 inside the container (MCP_HTTP_HOST) and defaults to AUTH_MODE=gateway. Publish the port on loopback and pass the S2S secret. In gateway mode the access token arrives on each request as X-CyberQP-Access-Token. It is not read from the environment.

docker build -t cyberqp-mcp .
docker run \
  -e CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET="$CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET" \
  -p 127.0.0.1:8080:8080 \
  cyberqp-mcp

Compose refuses to start when CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET is unset, defaults AUTH_MODE to gateway, publishes 127.0.0.1:8080:8080, and does not set CYBERQP_ACCESS_TOKEN or env_file:

CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET="$CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET" docker compose up

Single-tenant HTTP (AUTH_MODE=env) still requires the S2S secret, then uses CYBERQP_ACCESS_TOKEN:

docker run \
  -e CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET="$CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET" \
  -e AUTH_MODE=env \
  -e CYBERQP_ACCESS_TOKEN="$CYBERQP_ACCESS_TOKEN" \
  -p 127.0.0.1:8080:8080 \
  cyberqp-mcp

Local HTTP without a secret is development-only. It binds 127.0.0.1 even when MCP_HTTP_HOST is 0.0.0.0, and logs a warning:

MCP_TRANSPORT=http MCP_ALLOW_INSECURE_DEV=1 npm run start:http