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GitHub Actions workflow security audit - 21 checks: pinning, permissions, secrets, injection.
GitHub Actions workflow security audit - 21 checks: pinning, permissions, secrets, injection.
Remote endpoints: streamable-http: https://unbearable-dev--github-actions-audit.apify.actor/mcp
This is a well-designed security audit MCP server with clean code quality, proper error handling, and appropriate permission scoping. The server validates inputs, parses YAML safely, and provides comprehensive GitHub Actions workflow security checks. No critical vulnerabilities or malicious patterns detected. Minor findings are limited to low-severity code quality suggestions that do not impact security. Supply chain analysis found 3 known vulnerabilities in dependencies (1 critical, 1 high severity).
5 files analyzed · 7 issues found
Security scores are indicators to help you make informed decisions, not guarantees. Always review permissions before connecting any MCP server.
This plugin requests these system permissions. Most are normal for its category.
Available as Local & Remote
This plugin can run on your machine or connect to a hosted endpoint. during install.
From the project's GitHub README.
MCP server that audits
.github/workflows/*.ymlfiles for supply-chain risks. Catches script injection, leaked tokens, unpinned actions, broad permissions, andpull_request_targetfoot-guns — the patterns behind several 2024–2025 supply-chain incidents.
Built by Unbearable Labs. Pay-per-event — only billed when a tool is actually called.
Newsletter: Unbearable TechTips Weekly · All Actors: github.com/UnbearableDev
Point any MCP-capable client (Claude Desktop, Cursor, n8n, Make, Zapier, custom agents) at this server, hand it a workflow YAML, and get back structured findings with:
| Tool | Purpose |
|---|---|
audit_workflow(workflow_yaml? | workflow_url?, min_severity='low') | Run all checks |
check_secrets(...) | Secret-leakage paths only |
check_permissions(...) | GITHUB_TOKEN scope issues only |
check_action_pinning(...) | Action version-pinning only |
check_runner_security(...) | Self-hosted runner + script injection |
check_workflow_config(...) | Timeout / config hygiene |
check_supply_chain_advanced(...) | TeamPCP-class supply-chain patterns (GHA-201..208) |
list_checks(category?) | Browse the catalog |
Provide exactly one of workflow_yaml (paste the content) or workflow_url (HTTPS URL — typically a GitHub raw URL to a specific workflow file).
| ID | Category | Severity | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| GHA-001 | secrets | high | Secret interpolated directly into run: script |
| GHA-002 | secrets | high | Secret printed via echo / set-output |
| GHA-003 | secrets | medium | Secret used in if: condition |
| GHA-004 | secrets | high | Hardcoded credential pattern in env: |
| GHA-010 | permissions | high | permissions: write-all granted |
| GHA-011 | permissions | medium | No top-level permissions: (inherits broad default) |
| GHA-013 | permissions | high | pull_request_target + checkout PR head = PWNing pattern |
| GHA-020 | action_pinning | high | Third-party action pinned to mutable tag |
| GHA-021 | action_pinning | high | Third-party action pinned to mutable branch |
| GHA-022 | action_pinning | medium | First-party action not SHA-pinned |
| GHA-030 | runner_security | medium | Self-hosted runner used on pull_request from forks |
| GHA-032 | runner_security | high | Script injection via untrusted github.event.* interpolation |
| GHA-040 | workflow_config | low | No timeout-minutes on job |
| GHA-201 | supply_chain_advanced | high | Action pinned to unpinned branch ref (TeamPCP-class: @main/@master) |
| GHA-202 | supply_chain_advanced | high | Action pinned to mutable tag — SHA pin recommended |
| GHA-203 | supply_chain_advanced | critical | pull_request_target + checkout of PR head SHA/ref (codecov/tj-actions exploitation path) |
| GHA-204 | supply_chain_advanced | high | Script injection via github.event.* user-controlled field in run: |
| GHA-205 | supply_chain_advanced | medium | Action from non-allowlisted owner (untrusted 3rd-party) |
| GHA-206 | supply_chain_advanced | high | Top-level permissions: write-all or contents: write without per-job scoping |
| GHA-207 | supply_chain_advanced | medium | Secret logged via echo / cat in run: block |
| GHA-208 | supply_chain_advanced | low | Action uses a known-retired tag |
| Event | USD |
|---|---|
| Any audit / check_* tool call | $0.02 |
list_checks discovery | $0.005 |
{
"mcpServers": {
"gha-audit": {
"transport": "streamable-http",
"url": "https://YOUR-ACTOR-URL.apify.actor/mcp"
}
}
}
docker-compose-audit — docker-compose.yml security auditdockerfile-audit — Dockerfile security & qualityhu-postcode-validator — Hungarian postcode lookupSource: github.com/UnbearableDev/github-actions-audit.
Issues + ideas: unbearabledev@gmail.com.
📬 Built by Noel @ Unbearable Labs. More MCP servers + audit tips in the newsletter: https://unbearabletechtips.beehiiv.com
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