Saihm Mcp Server Pro MCP Server

SAIHM Memory for AI Agents

@saihm/mcp-server-pro — portable memory for AI agents, sealed on your own machine.

Your agent remembers what matters — across sessions, across models, and across vendors. Share a memory with another agent, revoke it, or erase it for good. The service that stores it never holds your keys and cannot read it.

Start free — just ask your agent to "Join SAIHM"

No card. No master secret to invent. No website visit. Paste this into your MCP host (Claude Desktop, Claude Code, Cursor):

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "saihm": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": ["-y", "@saihm/mcp-server-pro"],
      "env": {
        "SAIHM_ENDPOINT_URL": "https://saihm.coti.global/mcp"
      },
      "timeout": 60
    }
  }
}

Then say this to your agent:

Join SAIHM.

That is the whole setup. Your agent generates your key on this device, hands you a one-time sign-in that confirms you are a unique person, and your memory is live. Next session, it is still there.

Keep timeout as written — some hosts allow a start-up budget as short as 1.5 s (Cline's default), too short for npx to resolve and launch, and a server that misses it is skipped silently, with no error in the chat.

Back up ~/.saihm/free-identity.key. It is the only key to your memory. If you lose it, no one — including SAIHM — can open your cells. That is the design, not a gap: the service is blind, so there is nobody to ask for a reset.

Under the hood

• Seal before send — remember encrypts client-side; recall decrypts client-side. Your plaintext, master secret, and key-encryption key never leave this process.
• Post-quantum — ML-DSA-65 identity/signing, ML-KEM-768 authenticated sharing (via @saihm/client-pro).
• Same transport as the standards client — POST {method, params} + Authorization: Bearer <JWT>; the endpoint binds your tenant from the JWT. HTTPS-only (loopback http permitted for local dev).
• Crypto-shred erasure — forget destroys the endpoint-side wrapped DEK, rendering the cell undecryptable (GDPR Art. 17).

See it run

• Live cross-model demos — offline, ~1 min each, no account: https://citw2.github.io/saihm-demos/. Ground a memory you own in Claude, GPT, DeepSeek, Qwen, Kimi, or GLM, then prove you can erase it. demo-claude-code runs a stdio MCP server exactly like this one for Claude Code and Cursor.
• Token benchmark — recalling a bounded set of memory cells instead of re-sending the transcript cut input tokens by 62.8%–85.9% (up to ~86%) across a realistic multi-session task; open, offline, reproducible: https://github.com/citw2/saihm-token-benchmark.

Tool reference

Each tool carries MCP annotations (readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint) and a human-readable title, so MCP hosts can gate confirmations and agents can select the right tool at reasoning time.

Install

npm install @saihm/mcp-server-pro

Run as an MCP server

The package ships a stdio MCP server. Point your MCP host (Claude Desktop, Claude Code, …) at it — paste this once:

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "saihm": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": ["-y", "@saihm/mcp-server-pro"],
      "env": {
        "SAIHM_ENDPOINT_URL": "https://saihm.coti.global/mcp",
        "SAIHM_MASTER_SECRET_HEX": "<your 64+ hex master secret>",
        "SAIHM_TIER": "PRO",
        "SAIHM_PAYMENT_METHOD": "stripe"
      },
      "timeout": 60
    }
  }
}

Two details worth keeping as written. timeout: hosts that don't recognise it ignore it, but Cline's default start-up budget is 1.5 s — too short for npx to resolve and launch the package — and a server that misses it is skipped silently, with no error in the chat. No trailing commas: these config files are parsed as strict JSON, and a stray comma doesn't just break this entry, it invalidates the whole file and drops every MCP server you had configured.

With no SAIHM_AUTH_HEADER, the server self-onboards: it mints and auto-refreshes its own short-lived access token from your master secret, so there is no token to paste or re-paste. Eight tools are exposed (saihm_remember, saihm_recall, saihm_forget, saihm_status, saihm_share, saihm_revoke_share, saihm_governance_propose, saihm_governance_vote).

Zero-config free start — what "Join SAIHM" actually does

The whole configuration is at the top of this README: point SAIHM_ENDPOINT_URL at the hosted endpoint and say "Join SAIHM" to your agent. Here is what happens when you do.

The agent calls the saihm_join tool, which generates your identity on this device (a 32-byte master secret written mode-600 to ~/.saihm/free-identity.key) and hands back a one-time device sign-in — open the link, enter the short code, approve. That step confirms you're a unique person; SAIHM never sees or stores the token. When it returns, your free, non-custodial memory is live and the other tools work. The key persists on this device, so your next session resumes with your memory intact.

saihm_join is a one-time onboarding affordance, not a ninth protocol tool. It is registered by default; set SAIHM_SELF_JOIN=0 to suppress it and expose only the canonical eight. Because your master secret is generated locally and never leaves the process, back up ~/.saihm/free-identity.key — if you lose it, no one (including SAIHM) can open your cells.

Start free

The simplest way: just ask your agent to "Join SAIHM." Self-join is on by default, so the saihm_join tool is already there — it generates your key on this machine, starts the sign-in, and activates the free tier for you. No master secret to invent, no env vars, no website visit.

Prefer a terminal? One command, no configuration:

npx -y @saihm/mcp-server-pro free-join

That is the whole thing. It generates your identity on this device, writes it mode-600 to ~/.saihm/free-identity.key, and starts the sign-in — no env vars, no master secret to invent, no card. Open the printed link, enter the short code, approve. SAIHM never sees or stores the GitHub token: the sign-in stays in your browser and the token is server-ephemeral. When it returns, start the server normally (drop free-join) and it self-onboards on the free tier.

Back up the key file it prints. It is the only key to your memory — if you lose it, no one, including SAIHM, can open your cells.

If you would rather generate the secret yourself, do that first — it never leaves your machine, and it is the only key to your memory:

openssl rand -hex 32 > saihm-master.key && chmod 600 saihm-master.key

Then point free-join at it. An identity already supplied through the environment is used as-is and nothing is generated:

SAIHM_ENDPOINT_URL=https://saihm.coti.global/mcp \
SAIHM_MASTER_SECRET_FILE=./saihm-master.key \
SAIHM_TIER=FREE \
  npx -y @saihm/mcp-server-pro free-join

The free trial is for testing on real infrastructure: a fixed, one-time allowance of writes, reads, and shares that never resets or refills. No card, and nothing to cancel — it is not an auto-renewing subscription. The client shows your remaining balance and warns you as you approach it, so nothing fails by surprise.

Upgrade any time — same key, same memories:

SAIHM_ENDPOINT_URL=https://saihm.coti.global/mcp \
SAIHM_MASTER_SECRET_HEX=<your 64+ hex master secret> \
SAIHM_TIER=FREE \
  npx -y @saihm/mcp-server-pro upgrade PRO

This prints a monthly checkout link bound to your identity; billing attaches to the same key, so every memory you already have persists. Pay, switch your config to the paid tier, and start the server normally.

Subscribe directly, skipping the free tier

Most people should start with free-join above and upgrade later — the key and every memory carry over. This path is for going straight to a paid tier from the command line instead of the website. Unlike free-join it is not zero-config: it needs your own master secret and an explicit tier.

SAIHM_ENDPOINT_URL=https://saihm.coti.global/mcp \
SAIHM_MASTER_SECRET_HEX=<your 64+ hex master secret> \
SAIHM_TIER=PRO SAIHM_PAYMENT_METHOD=stripe \
  npx -y @saihm/mcp-server-pro join

It prints a Stripe checkout link bound to your identity. Pay in a browser, then start the server normally (drop join) — it connects automatically. Keep SAIHM_MASTER_SECRET_HEX safe: it is the only key to your memory and cannot be recovered.

Use as a library

import { SaihmProClient } from '@saihm/mcp-server-pro';

// Boot from env: SAIHM_ENDPOINT_URL, SAIHM_MASTER_SECRET_HEX
//   self-onboard (recommended): + SAIHM_PAYMENT_METHOD + SAIHM_TIER (omit SAIHM_AUTH_HEADER)
//   static token (advanced):    + SAIHM_AUTH_HEADER="Bearer <JWT>"
//   (optional: SAIHM_SEQ_STATE_PATH)
const saihm = SaihmProClient.bootFromEnv();

// Store — encrypted before it leaves the process.
const { cellId } = await saihm.remember('remember this');

// Recall — decrypted after it returns.
const cell = await saihm.recallOne(cellId);
console.log(cell?.plaintext); // 'remember this'

// Recall everything (client-side keyword filter; the endpoint has no plaintext to filter on).
const matches = await saihm.recall('this');

// Update an existing cell (a fresh monotonic sequence is issued automatically).
await saihm.remember('new contents', { cellId });

// Forget — crypto-shred.
await saihm.forget(cellId);

// Share a cell with another agent, end-to-end authenticated. Pin the grantee's agentIdHash
// out-of-band; the library rejects directory key-substitution.
await saihm.share({
  cellId,
  recipientRecord, // the grantee's published identity record (hex)
  recipientPinnedAgentIdHashHex, // pinned out-of-band
});
await saihm.revokeShare(cellId, recipientPinnedAgentIdHashHex);

// Read a cell another agent shared TO you (the recipient side of `share`). Pin the
// sharer's agentIdHash out-of-band; the library verifies the sharer's signature and
// returns null when there is no live grant (e.g. revoked, or the sharer crypto-shredded it).
const shared = await saihm.recallShared({
  sharerPinnedAgentIdHashHex, // the sharer's agentIdHash, pinned out-of-band
  sharerRecord, // the sharer's published identity record (hex)
  cellId,
});
console.log(shared?.plaintext);

// Operator-observable metadata only (no plaintext).
const status = await saihm.status();

The derived saihm.agentIdHash is the sub the endpoint binds your tenant to — when self-onboarding the client proves it via ML-DSA; with a static SAIHM_AUTH_HEADER it must equal the JWT sub. Publish saihm.identityRecord so other agents can share to you.

Configuration

Self-onboarding (paste once): with SAIHM_AUTH_HEADER unset, the client proves control of your identity via the endpoint's ML-DSA challenge/response and mints its own token, refreshing transparently on expiry. Cancelling your subscription stops the next refresh, so access ends naturally.

Errors

Non-2xx responses throw SaihmEndpointError with status and a typed code (e.g. BLIND_BAD_EXPIRY, BLIND_STALE_SEQ, governance_unavailable). Branch on those rather than the message.

Security model

Where sealed cells are stored

This client seals cells and hands the ciphertext to whatever operator endpoint you point SAIHM_ENDPOINT_URL at; that operator chooses and configures the durable storage backend — typically a local IPFS / Kubo node first, then a Filecoin deep-archive provider (e.g. Pinata, Synapse, or Lighthouse). Storage is operator-configured by design: the protocol never locks anyone to a single provider. If you run your own endpoint, provisioning that backend is your responsibility — see your operator deployment guide.

Prefer not to run storage at all? Join SAIHM at https://saihm.coti.global and use the hosted non-custodial operator, which provides durable storage for you. Because this client seals every cell locally, the hosted operator only ever stores ciphertext and never holds your keys — managed storage without giving up custody (a paid hosted service).

License

Apache-2.0 © SAIHM