Server data from the Official MCP Registry
Check if a counterparty is safe to pay: trust/risk score for AI agents. Scam/phishing screen.
Check if a counterparty is safe to pay: trust/risk score for AI agents. Scam/phishing screen.
Remote endpoints: streamable-http: https://vouch.futuronoti.workers.dev/mcp
Valid MCP server (1 strong, 0 medium validity signals). 1 known CVE in dependencies (1 critical, 0 high severity) Imported from the Official MCP Registry. 1 finding(s) downgraded by scanner intelligence.
2 tools verified · Open access · 2 issues found
Security scores are indicators to help you make informed decisions, not guarantees. Always review permissions before connecting any MCP server.
This plugin requests these system permissions. Most are normal for its category.
Remote Plugin
No local installation needed. Your AI client connects to the remote endpoint directly.
Add this to your MCP configuration to connect:
{
"mcpServers": {
"io-github-notifuturo-vouch": {
"url": "https://vouch.futuronoti.workers.dev/mcp"
}
}
}From the project's GitHub README.
A per-call payment trust & reputation API for AI agents — monetized over x402.
When an autonomous agent is about to pay a merchant, API, or counterparty, it asks Vouch one question first: is this safe to pay? Vouch returns an explainable trust score, and charges a fraction of a cent per call in USDC — no accounts, no API keys, no Stripe. Billing is the x402 protocol itself.
The agentic-commerce rails (Coinbase x402, AWS, Visa, Mastercard, Agnic) are being built by giants. The governance layer — should this agent trust this counterparty with money? — is the named #1 blocker to autonomous spend and is wide open. Vouch is a thin, self-serve pick-and-shovel on top of those rails.
Every call makes the product better: checks and community reports accrete into a reputation dataset that compounds with usage — the moat a bootstrapped team can actually build.
agent ──POST /v1/check { target }──▶ x402 paywall (402 → pay USDC → retry)
│
▼
┌─────────── scoring engine ───────────┐
│ transport · domain heuristics · │
│ threat feed · reputation (D1) │
└───────────────────────────────────────┘
│
{ score, risk, reasons[] }
Scoring is a weighted average of independent signals, with a safety override: any single hard-negative signal (e.g. a threat-feed hit) caps the overall score so one strong red flag can't be averaged away.
| Signal | Weight | Source |
|---|---|---|
threat_feed | 3 | URLhaus host list (THREAT_FEED_URL), cached, fails open |
reputation | 2 | Vouch's own accumulating D1 data (the moat) |
transport | 1.5 | HTTPS / valid host |
domain_heuristics | 1 | Punycode, raw IPs, abuse-prone TLDs, etc. |
| Method & path | Cost | Description |
|---|---|---|
POST /v1/check | x402 (USDC) | Full verdict → { score, risk, reasons, signals, attestation } (signed Ed25519 receipt) |
POST /v1/score | free (rate-limited) | Score + risk only → { score, risk }. Pay /v1/check for the reasons |
GET /v1/attestation/pubkey | free | Ed25519 public key (JWK) to verify a /v1/check attestation |
POST /v1/report | free | Submit a flag or vouch for a host |
GET /v1/stats | free | Aggregate reputation totals (hosts, checks, flags, vouches) |
POST /mcp | free | MCP Streamable-HTTP server (vouch_score, vouch_report tools) |
GET /health | free | Liveness |
GET / | free | Service info (HTML landing for browsers) |
CORS is open (*) and the x402 payment headers are exposed, so browser-hosted
agents can preflight and complete the pay/retry flow.
/v1/report (abuse model)POST /v1/report is free and unauthenticated by design — anyone can submit a
flag or vouch for a host, so the raw flags/vouches counts are community
signals, not ground truth. Abuse is contained by:
0.3, ramping to 1.0 only after ~7 days of sustained reporting. The scoring
signal uses these weighted totals, so spinning up fresh sybil identities buys far less
influence. A source can also move a given host's counter at most once per 24h (per-source
de-dup); raw counts are still logged for audit.reputation is a non-authoritative
signal: it can lower a score but cannot, on its own, force a critical verdict.
Only objective signals (threat feeds, transport) can hard-cap the score. So a burst
of anonymous flags can't unilaterally brand a legitimate counterparty as unsafe.target/reason/reporter are length-capped before storage.Treat /v1/stats and report counts as a crowd-sourced prior that informs the paid
verdict, not as an authoritative blocklist.
TypeScript · Hono · Cloudflare Workers (free tier) ·
D1 (free SQLite) · @x402/* v2 · public facilitator at x402.org/facilitator.
Live on Base mainnet (X402_NETWORK=base, real USDC, $0.01/call). For local
development, set X402_NETWORK=base-sepolia and fund a throwaway wallet from the
free Circle faucet. The live network and price are
authoritatively advertised at /.well-known/x402.
npm install
npm run typecheck
npm test
cp .dev.vars.example .dev.vars # set PAY_TO_ADDRESS (your testnet wallet)
wrangler d1 create vouch # paste database_id into wrangler.toml
npm run db:init # apply schema locally
npm run dev # local Worker
MIT — see LICENSE.
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