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Agentguard MCP Server

Developer ToolsModerate6.2MCP RegistryLocal
Free

Server data from the Official MCP Registry

Network-egress firewall for agent tools: check URLs against a declarative policy.

About

Network-egress firewall for agent tools: check URLs against a declarative policy.

Security Report

6.2
Moderate6.2Moderate Risk

Clean, well-structured MCP server with appropriate authentication model (policy-based validation), no malicious patterns, and permissions aligned with its stated purpose. The server wraps agentguard's policy engine to check URLs without making actual requests. Minor code quality improvements suggested around input validation and error handling, but no security vulnerabilities identified. Supply chain analysis found 2 known vulnerabilities in dependencies (0 critical, 2 high severity). Package verification found 1 issue.

4 files analyzed · 7 issues found

Security scores are indicators to help you make informed decisions, not guarantees. Always review permissions before connecting any MCP server.

Permissions Required

This plugin requests these system permissions. Most are normal for its category.

env_vars

Check that this permission is expected for this type of plugin.

How to Install

Add this to your MCP configuration file:

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "io-github-mukundakatta-agentguard": {
      "args": [
        "-y",
        "@mukundakatta/agentguard-mcp"
      ],
      "command": "npx"
    }
  }
}

Documentation

View on GitHub

From the project's GitHub README.

agentguard-mcp

MCP server for @mukundakatta/agentguard. Lets Claude Desktop, Cursor, Cline, Windsurf, Zed, or any other MCP client check whether a URL is allowed under a network-egress policy before any fetch.

npx -y @mukundakatta/agentguard-mcp

Three tools:

  • check_url — single URL check: returns { allowed, reason } without making any actual request.
  • check_urls_batch — batch check with per-URL decisions plus a summary.
  • validate_policy — sanity-check a policy spec for empty allowlists, overly broad * wildcards, and malformed host patterns.

Add to your client

Claude Desktop

Edit ~/Library/Application Support/Claude/claude_desktop_config.json (macOS) or %APPDATA%\Claude\claude_desktop_config.json (Windows):

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "agentguard": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": ["-y", "@mukundakatta/agentguard-mcp"]
    }
  }
}

Same shape for Cursor (~/.cursor/mcp.json), Cline, Windsurf, Zed.

Tool examples

check_url:

{
  "url": "https://api.openai.com/v1/chat",
  "policy": { "allow": ["api.openai.com", "*.anthropic.com"] }
}

Returns:

{ "allowed": true, "reason": "matched_allowlist", "detail": null }

check_urls_batch:

{
  "urls": [
    "https://api.openai.com/v1/chat",
    "https://evil.example.com/leak"
  ],
  "policy": { "allow": ["api.openai.com"] }
}

Returns:

{
  "results": [
    { "url": "https://api.openai.com/v1/chat", "allowed": true, ... },
    { "url": "https://evil.example.com/leak", "allowed": false, "reason": "not_in_allowlist", ... }
  ],
  "summary": { "total": 2, "allowed_count": 1, "denied_count": 1 }
}

validate_policy:

{ "policy": { "allow": ["*", "https://api.example.com", "api.example.com/v1"] } }

Returns issues for the * wildcard, the scheme prefix, and the path suffix — common mistakes when first writing a policy.

Why a separate MCP server

@mukundakatta/agentguard is a zero-dependency JavaScript library. This MCP server makes its decision engine accessible from any MCP-aware AI assistant: ask Claude "does my agent's tool list pass this firewall?" or "which of these 50 URLs would my policy block?" and the assistant calls these tools directly.

Note: this MCP server only checks URLs — it does not actually wrap fetch or block real requests. For runtime enforcement, use @mukundakatta/agentguard directly inside your Node process.

Sibling MCP servers

Part of the agent-stack series:

License

MIT

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