Token-efficient Ghidra RE: decompile, xrefs, Swift/ObjC, ELF/Mach-O, async analysis
Token-efficient Ghidra RE: decompile, xrefs, Swift/ObjC, ELF/Mach-O, async analysis
The MCP server implements reasonable authentication (bearer token for network access, path restrictions), has proper input validation for parameters, and demonstrates good secure coding practices (frozen configs, no hardcoded credentials). However, there are moderate concerns around unsafe subprocess/shell command handling in the HTTP transport setup, limited validation of auth tokens, and some code quality issues in error handling and logging. Permissions are appropriate for a reverse-engineering tool. Supply chain analysis found 2 known vulnerabilities in dependencies (0 critical, 1 high severity). Package verification found 1 issue.
3 files analyzed · 11 issues found
Security scores are indicators to help you make informed decisions, not guarantees. Always review permissions before connecting any MCP server.
This plugin requests these system permissions. Most are normal for its category.
Set these up before or after installing:
Environment variable: GHIDRA_INSTALL_DIR
Add this to your MCP configuration file:
{
"mcpServers": {
"io-github-johnzfitch-pyghidra-lite": {
"env": {
"GHIDRA_INSTALL_DIR": "your-ghidra-install-dir-here"
},
"args": [
"pyghidra-lite"
],
"command": "uvx"
}
}
}From the project's GitHub README.
Token-efficient MCP server for Ghidra-based reverse engineering. Analyze ELF, Mach-O, and PE binaries with Swift, Objective-C, and Hermes support.
Bottom line: a lean, security-first Ghidra MCP. It is read-only by default — analysis tools never mutate your binaries or the server's configuration (which is frozen for the life of the process). The one tool that writes, annotate (rename / comment / prototype), is opt-in (--allow-write) and human-confirmed: every change is approved by you through an MCP elicitation prompt before it's committed, and it fails closed if your client can't ask. You get an analyst-agent that can persist its findings — under supervision — without giving up the read-only safety story.
1. Prerequisites
JDK 21+ and Ghidra 11.x are required.
# macOS
brew install openjdk@21
brew install ghidra
# Ubuntu/Debian
sudo apt install openjdk-21-jdk
# Download Ghidra from https://ghidra-sre.org
# Arch Linux
sudo pacman -S jdk21-openjdk
yay -S ghidra
Ghidra installed via Homebrew (brew install ghidra) or to /opt/ghidra or ~/ghidra is found automatically. Set GHIDRA_INSTALL_DIR only for non-standard paths.
2. Install pyghidra-lite
pip install pyghidra-lite
3. Add to Claude Code
Create .mcp.json in your project (or ~/.claude.json for global):
{
"mcpServers": {
"pyghidra-lite": {
"command": "pyghidra-lite"
}
}
}
4. Use it
You: Analyze the binary at /path/to/binaries/app
Claude: [calls load, info, code...]
pip install pyghidra-lite
yay -S python-pyghidra-lite
git clone https://github.com/johnzfitch/pyghidra-lite
cd pyghidra-lite
pip install -e .
Add to ~/Library/Application Support/Claude/claude_desktop_config.json (macOS) or %APPDATA%\Claude\claude_desktop_config.json (Windows):
{
"mcpServers": {
"pyghidra-lite": {
"command": "uvx",
"args": ["pyghidra-lite"]
}
}
}
uvx auto-installs pyghidra-lite from PyPI on first run. Ghidra is auto-detected; set GHIDRA_INSTALL_DIR in env if needed:
{
"mcpServers": {
"pyghidra-lite": {
"command": "uvx",
"args": ["pyghidra-lite"],
"env": {
"GHIDRA_INSTALL_DIR": "/path/to/ghidra"
}
}
}
}
Create .mcp.json in your project (or ~/.claude.json for global):
{
"mcpServers": {
"pyghidra-lite": {
"command": "pyghidra-lite"
}
}
}
For single-session use or debugging, run the server directly:
{
"mcpServers": {
"pyghidra-lite": {
"command": "pyghidra-lite",
"args": ["serve"]
}
}
}
{
"mcpServers": {
"pyghidra-lite": {
"command": "pyghidra-lite",
"args": [
"serve",
"--ghidra-dir", "/path/to/ghidra"
]
}
}
}
By default, pyghidra-lite can load binaries from any path (the MCP client handles permissions). Use --restrict-path to lock down access:
{
"mcpServers": {
"pyghidra-lite": {
"command": "pyghidra-lite",
"args": [
"serve",
"--restrict-path", "/home/user/binaries",
"--restrict-path", "/opt/targets"
]
}
}
}
The HTTP/SSE transports are shared and apply DNS-rebinding protection (Host/Origin
validation). Binding to a non-loopback address additionally requires both
--restrict-path and a bearer token:
pyghidra-lite serve -t streamable-http --host 0.0.0.0 \
--restrict-path /opt/targets \
--auth-token "$PYGHIDRA_LITE_AUTH_TOKEN" \
--allowed-host re.example.com:8000 # if fronted under another hostname
Clients then send Authorization: Bearer <token> on every request. Terminate TLS
at a reverse proxy for remote access.
pyghidra-lite provides 8 read-only analysis tools plus 1 opt-in write tool, all auto-detecting format (ELF/Mach-O/PE) and language (Swift/ObjC/Hermes):
| Tool | Purpose | Key Parameters |
|---|---|---|
load | Import and analyze binary | path, profile?, fresh?, bootstrap?, bootstrap_mode? |
delete | Remove binary and cancel jobs | name |
binaries | List binaries + job status | jobs?, rank_sources? |
info | Binary overview | binary, detail? (summary/full/format/sections/entropy) |
functions | List/search functions | binary, query?, type? (all/swift/objc/imports/exports) |
code | Decompile or disassemble | binary, target, what? (decompile/asm), cfg? |
xrefs | References and call graphs | binary, target, direction?, depth?, diff? |
search | Find strings, bytes, symbols | binary, query, type?, mode?, bg? |
annotate 🔒 | Rename / comment / set prototype | binary, target, action, name?/comment?/prototype? |
🔒 annotate is the only tool that writes. It is disabled unless the server is
started with --allow-write, and every change requires interactive
confirmation (MCP elicitation) before it is committed — clients that can't
confirm get a preview only. See Writing back.
# Import and analyze
load("/path/to/binary", profile="fast")
# Version-track from a prior build, including synthetic IDs for unnamed code
load("/path/to/new.bin", profile="deep", bootstrap="old.bin", bootstrap_mode="all")
# Get overview with full triage
info("mybinary", detail="full")
# List Swift functions
functions("mybinary", type="swift")
# Decompile with CFG
code("mybinary", "main", cfg=True)
# Search strings in background
search("mybinary", ["password", "api_key"], bg=True)
# Get cross-references
xrefs("mybinary", "malloc", depth=2)
All tools automatically detect:
Use the type and detail parameters to access format/language-specific features.
bootstrap_mode="named": transfer only meaningful source names (default).bootstrap_mode="all": also assign stable synthetic labels to source FUN_* functions during transfer, which is useful for large version-to-version bootstrap workflows where uniqueness matters more than semantics.By default pyghidra-lite is read-only — no tool mutates your binaries. To let
an agent persist findings (rename a function, attach a comment, fix a prototype),
start the server with --allow-write:
pyghidra-lite serve --allow-write # or PYGHIDRA_LITE_ALLOW_WRITE=1
Then the annotate tool becomes usable:
annotate("mybinary", target="FUN_00401000", action="rename", name="parse_header")
annotate("mybinary", target="parse_header", action="comment", comment="validates the v2 header")
annotate("mybinary", target="parse_header", action="prototype", prototype="int parse_header(char *buf, int len)")
Every call is human-confirmed: the server sends an MCP elicitation prompt
showing the exact old -> new change, and only commits if you accept. If the
server was started without --allow-write, the tool refuses; if your MCP client
doesn't support elicitation, the tool returns a preview with applied: false
and writes nothing (fail closed). Confirmed changes are written in a single
Ghidra transaction and saved to the on-disk project.
Audit journal. Because MCP elicitation ultimately trusts the client (an
autonomous "auto-approve" client can self-confirm), every write is recorded in
annotate_audit.jsonl next to the projects — and every declined or failed
attempt is logged too. Each line records old -> new, so the journal is both an
accountability trail and an undo log; a flood of entries is your signal that an
auto-agent is churning, and the server also nudges (ctx.warning) as write
volume climbs. The journal is fail-closed and hardened: a write is recorded
before it's applied (if it can't be journaled, it isn't committed), the file
is created 0o600 and opened with O_NOFOLLOW (a symlinked journal is
refused), and it rotates by size so it can't grow without bound.
| Profile | Use Case |
|---|---|
fast | Quick triage, disables 20 slow analyzers (default) |
default | Balanced, full Ghidra analysis |
deep | Thorough analysis for obfuscated code |
The server defaults to fast to stay within MCP timeout limits. Use load(fresh=True) to run deeper analysis when needed:
# Default import uses fast profile
load("/path/to/binary")
# Re-analyze with deep profile
load("/path/to/binary", profile="deep", fresh=True)
pyghidra-lite is designed for minimal token usage:
functions(binary, type="all") returns minimal {name, addr} pairsinfo(detail="full"), code(cfg=True), or richer type/what modes only when neededBy default, pyghidra-lite runs as a lightweight stdio proxy (~10MB) that forwards to a persistent shared HTTP backend (~500MB JVM). Multiple sessions share a single JVM instead of each spawning their own.
Claude Code session 1 ──stdio──> proxy ──┐
Claude Code session 2 ──stdio──> proxy ──┼──HTTP──> shared backend (1 JVM)
Claude Code session 3 ──stdio──> proxy ──┘ localhost:19101
The proxy auto-starts the backend on first use and the backend auto-exits after 30 minutes of idle. A file lock prevents concurrent proxy starts from spawning duplicate backends.
| Command | What it does |
|---|---|
pyghidra-lite | Stdio proxy (default) -- auto-starts backend |
pyghidra-lite serve | Direct stdio server (1 JVM per session) |
pyghidra-lite serve -t streamable-http | Start persistent HTTP backend manually |
pyghidra-lite stop | Stop the shared backend |
Set PYGHIDRA_LITE_NO_AUTOSTART=1 to disable auto-start (useful with systemd).
Each binary gets its own Ghidra project, enabling:
Projects stored in ~/.local/share/pyghidra-lite/projects/.
MIT
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