Depix MCP Server

depix-mcp

The MCP (Model Context Protocol) server for DePix App — the agent-facing interface of the non-custodial Pix↔DePix payment gateway and of a non-custodial Liquid wallet.

One MCP, two levels of access. Same package, same registry entry; what works depends only on whether the running instance has a seed:

Custody is decided by who holds the seed, not by the transport. Every spend materializes a signer in-process, and there is no remote-signing path — so DePix App cannot host working wallet tools without becoming custodial, and does not. That is physics, not a product tier.

What it is (and isn't)

Both levels:

• A pure client of the public DePix API (https://api.depixapp.com/api/*) for the 26 gateway tools. It holds zero critical credentials — no Eulen token, no database, no webhook HMAC. Your sk_ key is passed verbatim to the API on each call and lives only in memory for that request.
• Same door as everyone. No privileged path: the same auth, scopes and rate limits as any external agent.

Level 1 (mcp.depixapp.com) only: it never signs, never holds funds, never stores your key. It has no wallet code at all — the wallet engine is not merely disabled there, it is structurally absent from that deployment's import graph, and a CI guard (npm run guard:hosted) fails the build if that ever changes.

Level 2 (npx) only: the 29 wallet_* tools hold, send, convert and pay — signing locally, inside your own process, under guardrails (per-transaction and rolling-24h BRL caps, optional allowlist) that no tool call can raise. There is no tool that exports the seed, edits guardrails, or pays a merchant checkout QR.

Related — @depixapp/sdk

The wallet engine started life as the standalone @depixapp/sdk. It lives here now (src/wallet-engine/), and this package is where it is developed and released. The 1.2.x line of @depixapp/sdk stays on npm and keeps working; it is frozen, not deprecated. If what you want is an agent with a wallet, you want this package: it exposes the engine over MCP, so nothing has to be written.

Quickstart 1 — Connect Claude Code (remote, HTTP)

Pass your DePix API key as a Bearer header. Always start with a sandbox key.

claude mcp add --transport http depix https://mcp.depixapp.com/mcp \
  --header "Authorization: Bearer sk_test_YOUR_KEY"

Then test the connection by asking Claude to run get_account. It should return your merchant with is_live: false (sandbox).

Cursor — add to ~/.cursor/mcp.json (or a project .cursor/mcp.json):

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "depix": {
      "url": "https://mcp.depixapp.com/mcp",
      "headers": { "Authorization": "Bearer sk_test_YOUR_KEY" }
    }
  }
}

Or use the one-click deeplink. The key placeholder lives INSIDE the base64 config= value, so re-encode it with your real key first:

node -e 'const cfg={url:"https://mcp.depixapp.com/mcp",headers:{Authorization:"Bearer sk_test_YOUR_KEY"}};console.log(Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(cfg)).toString("base64"))'

cursor://anysphere.cursor-deeplink/mcp/install?name=depix&config=<base64 from the command above>

The claude.ai web UI custom-connector only supports OAuth (no custom header). This server is an OAuth 2.1 Resource Server (WorkOS AuthKit): the web connector signs you in, and the session forwards your verified login to the API as the bearer. To operate you must first link that login to your DePix account (dashboard → connector settings); until then the tools return a typed "not linked yet" message. OAuth sessions are read + merchant only and can never move money (wallet_write) — use an sk_ key for withdrawals. The whole OAuth surface is feature-flagged (AUTHKIT_DOMAIN): with it unset, only the sk_ header/stdio paths above are active. Terminal clients keep using sk_ keys.

Quickstart 2 — Local stdio, 59 tools (Claude Desktop / Claude Code / Cursor)

Requires Node.js ≥ 22.4. The only official npm package is @depixapp/mcp — the @depixapp scope is organization-owned; do not install any similarly-named unscoped package. Secrets come from the environment, never from a flag.

2a. Gateway only (no wallet)

Exactly the 26 tools of level 1, running locally:

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "depix": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": ["-y", "@depixapp/mcp"],
      "env": { "DEPIX_API_KEY": "sk_test_YOUR_KEY" }
    }
  }
}

All 59 tools are still listed — the 29 wallet_* ones answer with a typed wallet_not_configured error telling the agent to ask you to run init. That is deliberate: MCP hosts snapshot the tool list when they connect, so a catalog that grew later would mean "restart your client".

2b. First run — create the wallet

init is a human ceremony at a terminal, never an MCP tool. It prints your 12-word seed backup, so it refuses to run when stdin/stdout are not a real TTY, and no agent can invoke it:

npx -y @depixapp/mcp init            # create a new wallet
npx -y @depixapp/mcp init --restore  # import an existing 12-word mnemonic

It asks for (or generates) a passphrase — never echoed — walks you through the backup ritual, asks for your spending limits, and then wires the AI hosts it finds on the machine (Claude Code, Claude Desktop, Cursor) to this wallet by itself. The unlock key goes into the OS keychain, so the passphrase is never written into a host config. For a host it does not detect it prints the block to paste instead — and that block carries no secret:

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "depix": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": ["-y", "@depixapp/mcp"],
      "env": {
        "DEPIX_WALLET_DIR": "/Users/you/.depix-wallet",
        "DEPIX_GUARDRAIL_PER_TX_BRL_CENTS": "10000",
        "DEPIX_GUARDRAIL_DAILY_BRL_CENTS": "50000"
      }
    }
  }
}

Clear your terminal scrollback afterwards. Restart your MCP client and ask it to run wallet_status.

2c. Reading the 12 words again

npx -y @depixapp/mcp backup          # show this wallet's 12 words again

Same rules as init: a real terminal or nothing. It asks for your passphrase every time, even on a machine that unlocks the wallet by itself — the keychain unlock key exists so the server can start, not so anyone at the keyboard can read the seed. When you confirm you have copied the words, it wipes the screen and the scrollback. Quit your MCP client first: the wallet dir takes an exclusive lock, and a running server holds it.

Run the server directly to sanity-check:

DEPIX_API_KEY=sk_test_YOUR_KEY npx -y @depixapp/mcp

Self-hosting over HTTP is NOT trivially safe. The wallet tools have no auth of their own and the seed is loaded process-wide. Over local stdio that is fine. Exposed over HTTP, anyone who reaches the port can drain the wallet — bind to localhost and add your own bearer/mTLS + network isolation, or don't.

CLI subcommands

One bin, depix-mcp, with five subcommands — all of them acts for the human at the keyboard. npx -y @depixapp/mcp --help prints the same list.

None of the five is an MCP tool, and that is deliberate. Two of them (init, backup) display a 12-word seed, which must never transit model context or a conversation log. The other three choose which account the server acts as: as tools, an agent that read a poisoned web page could promote itself from its own sandbox account to yours.

Signing in as yourself — login / logout

npx -y @depixapp/mcp login                    # choose Google or GitHub in the browser
npx -y @depixapp/mcp login --provider github  # skip the chooser
npx -y @depixapp/mcp logout

login opens your browser on the DePix App sign-in and waits for the answer at http://127.0.0.1:47617/callback — this computer, never a remote one. The listener binds before the browser opens, so a second login running at the same time fails right there instead of sending your sign-in to whatever else holds that port. What comes back is exchanged for a session and sealed on disk with your wallet passphrase; the terminal prints who you signed in as, never the credential. On a headless or remote box there is no browser to open — use DEPIX_API_KEY there, or let the agent register its own account.

On 2.8.0 and 2.8.1, login needs DEPIX_WORKOS_CLIENT_ID set to the DePix App sign-in application — the id baked into those two versions points at an older client. From 2.8.2 the right one ships baked in and the command needs no configuration.

If an agent account is already registered on this machine, logging in changes nothing by default: the agent's account still wins, and login says so loudly. account use owner is what switches. logout removes the stored session and, when you had selected owner, drops that selection too — it would otherwise point at a login that no longer exists.

Which account acts — account status / account use

Two identities can live on one machine: the account the agent registered for itself (register_account) and your own login. Exactly one of them authenticates each call, and the order is fixed:

DEPIX_API_KEY  >  an explicit `account use`  >  the agent's own account  >  your login

npx -y @depixapp/mcp account status       # who is acting, and why
npx -y @depixapp/mcp account use owner    # act as your own DePix login
npx -y @depixapp/mcp account use agent    # act as the account the agent registered here

DEPIX_API_KEY in the server's environment beats everything below it. With that variable set, account use decides nothing — account status prints that warning in place. Unset it (and restart the server) to let your selection win.

account status prints labels only — a provider, an email, an expiry — never a token and never your passphrase.

Quickstart 3 — Sandbox testing (the full loop)

Always test with an sk_test_ key before sk_live_. Sandbox QRs are non-payable placeholders (SANDBOX-…-DO-NOT-PAY).

1. create_checkout — amount is always required; on the default Pix rail payer_tax_number is too (the CPF/CNPJ is required even in sandbox). Use a test CPF like 52998224725:

   { "amount": 1500, "payer_tax_number": "52998224725" }
   

   Returns a chk_… id, a payment_url, a sandbox pix.qr_code, and is_live: false.

2. simulate_checkout_payment — { "checkout_id": "chk_…" } marks the sandbox checkout paid (sandbox-only; live checkouts return sandbox_only).

3. wait_for_checkout — { "checkout_id": "chk_…" }. The server polls internally and streams progress; you make one call and it returns { "status": "completed", "terminal": true } — no client-side polling loop.

You can also read a synthetic deposit: get_deposit_status with a sandbox_… id returns depix_sent.

Charging on the DePix rail instead of Pix

create_checkout takes payment_method. The default "pix" is the flow above. With "depix" the payer sends DePix wallet-to-wallet on Liquid to the merchant's dedicated address — there is no Pix QR and no payer document:

{ "amount": 9990, "payment_method": "depix", "expected_discount_pct": 10 }

The response carries depix instead of pix: address, the exact amount_cents to send (face amount minus the merchant's discount, minus a sub-cent-window adjustment that makes the value unique — that uniqueness is how the payment is matched), the decimal amount a wallet signs, asset_id and a ready-to-scan uri. Send any other amount or any other asset and the payment cannot be credited automatically, and an on-chain payment is irreversible.

Settlement is observed on-chain: approved at the first confirmation (~1 min), completed at the second. expires_in accepts 300–3600 s here (default 1800) instead of the Pix rail's 300–1200. The rail must be enabled by the merchant — otherwise the API answers depix_not_enabled. On the local level, a registered agent account turns it on with configure_depix_rail ({ "enabled": true }): the tool derives a dedicated address from your own wallet and registers it, so you keep custody and the backend only gains a per-address viewing key. Sandbox DePix checkouts are deliberately unpayable (placeholder address, uri: null); drive them with simulate_checkout_payment.

Tools

26 gateway tools — available at both levels. Amounts are BRL cents.

Charges (cobranças). create_product with kind: "charge" creates a payment link with a due date and optional late fine/interest — rent, tuition, an instalment. It is served at pay.depixapp.com/c/{id}, never appears on the merchant's public store, and the amount is recomputed on each visit (base + fine + pro-rata interest for the current cycle). With recurrence the same link keeps working month after month, settling the oldest unpaid cycle first. list_products does not return charges unless you pass kind: "charge" (or "all"); charge rows then carry charge_state — current cycle, days late, today's total.

Do not confuse it with create_checkout, which mints a one-off payment that is paid once and is short-lived. A charge is the standing one.

The last six are the support channel: open a ticket, poll for the human reply, reply back, attach a screenshot or diagnostic/log file (base64, ~3 MB), or close it (up to 5 open per account). Replies are not pushed — poll get_support_ticket. Amounts are BRL cents. A tool call whose key lacks the required scope returns an insufficient_scope tool error naming the missing scope — that is the only way to discover a missing scope (the API never lists a key's scopes).

29 wallet_* tools — the local (npx) level only. They sign in-process with your seed; without one they return wallet_not_configured.

wallet_convert is the primary conversion surface (wallet_quote enumerates the routes); the provider-level tools are the escape hatch. wallet_shift_usdt is the one custodial route (SideShift) and says so. Amounts carry their unit in the field name: amount_cents is BRL cents, amount_sats is the asset's base units.

There is deliberately no tool to export the seed, change guardrails, edit the payout addresses, or pay a merchant checkout QR — not even from a fully injected model.

Configuration (public, no secrets)

Local (npx) level only — the wallet half:

There is deliberately no env for an API key, Eulen token, HMAC or DB credential in the remote server. In HTTP mode the key arrives per-request in the Authorization header. The wallet passphrase and seed exist only on the operator's machine — the hosted deployment reads neither and has no code that could.

Endpoints

• POST /mcp — the MCP Streamable HTTP endpoint (DELETE ends a session; GET returns 405 — this stateless server offers no standalone SSE stream).
• GET /.well-known/mcp.json — minimal discovery document.
• GET /api/health (also /) — service status.

Development

npm install
npm test           # vitest
npm run typecheck  # tsc --noEmit
npm run lint       # eslint
npm run build      # compile src (incl. the wallet engine) → dist
npm run smoke      # run the compiled dist: wasm init, address goldens, seed roundtrip
npm run guard:hosted   # the hosted deployment has no path to the wallet engine
npm run licenses:check # THIRD_PARTY_LICENSES matches the prod dep tree

Set DEPIX_TEST_KEY=sk_test_… to run the real-sandbox e2e test (test/e2e/sandbox.test.ts), otherwise it is skipped. Set DEPIX_SDK_OFFLINE=1 (CI does) to skip the one engine test that reads mainnet Esplora for real.

The wallet engine (src/wallet-engine/)

The 29 wallet tools come from the DePix App wallet engine. It used to be vendored here from a pinned commit of a second repository; it is now simply part of this package's source, developed and released with it. Its tests live in test/wallet-engine/, mirroring the layout.

Two settings the engine brings with it:

• tsconfig.wallet-engine.json typechecks src/wallet-engine/ + test/wallet-engine/ under the stricter options the engine was written with (noUncheckedIndexedAccess and friends). npm run typecheck runs the repo-wide pass and then this one; tsc has no per-directory options.
• floor-smoke in CI runs the compiled artifact on Node 22.4 exactly — the engines floor. The test matrix's "22" is whatever latest-22 resolves to, which never proves the floor.

Why the hosted deployment cannot sign

api/mcp.ts → src/http.ts → src/server.ts has zero import path to src/wallet-engine/**. Neither this repo nor Vercel runs a tree-shaking bundler, so that import graph is the whole guarantee. scripts/check-hosted-isolation.mjs enforces it twice — a static walk of the TypeScript sources and a @vercel/nft trace of the compiled entries — and its --self-test proves both checks reject a poisoned entry. Only src/stdio.ts → src/unified.ts may reach the engine.

CI (.github/workflows/ci.yml) runs typecheck + lint + test + build + smoke + both guards on every push to main and every PR, on Node 22 and 24, plus the Node 22.4 floor smoke — that is the correctness gate.

Releasing

Publishing is automated via GitHub Actions using npm Trusted Publishing (OIDC) — no npm token, no 2FA prompt, and every release carries build provenance. .github/workflows/publish-mcp.yml (on a v* tag) publishes the npm package and then the MCP Registry entry (registry/server.json).

To cut a release:

1. Bump the version in package.json, registry/server.json (both the top-level version and packages[].version) and the resolveServerVersion fallback in src/config.ts — they must match, and CI fails the release if the tag, package.json and the registry npm entry disagree (a unit test pins the config fallback). The MCP Registry is immutable per version, so anything that publishes from the tagged tree has to be right before the tag.
2. Commit to main.
3. Tag and push:

   git tag v2.0.0 && git push origin v2.0.0
   

The workflow verifies the versions, re-runs typecheck + lint + tests + both guards (ci.yml is not triggered by tags), publishes to npm with provenance, then publishes the registry entry (idempotent — re-running a tag is a safe no-op). Re-tagging an already-published version skips both publishes.

One-time setup (already done): the package is registered as an npm Trusted Publisher for this repo with workflow filename publish-mcp.yml (npmjs.com → package → Settings → Trusted Publisher). No secrets are stored in the repo.

Release smoke test

After a preview/production deploy:

1. claude mcp add --transport http depix <url>/mcp --header "Authorization: Bearer sk_test_…"
2. Ask Claude to run get_account → returns the merchant, is_live: false.
3. create_checkout (sandbox) → simulate_checkout_payment → wait_for_checkout → completed.

Pushing to main deploys to production (mcp.depixapp.com). Validate on a Vercel preview deploy before merging. Previews are reachable out of the box: a non-production deployment adds its own VERCEL_URL and VERCEL_BRANCH_URL to the DNS-rebinding allowlist (resolveAllowedHosts), and production widens by nothing. If you ever need to allow another host, set MCP_ALLOWED_HOSTS to the exact hostname — the allowlist is an exact match, so *.vercel.app matches nothing and would leave the preview unreachable.