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Event-sourced world model for multi-LLM agents: propose, validate, and read a shared state.
Event-sourced world model for multi-LLM agents: propose, validate, and read a shared state.
Remote endpoints: streamable-http: https://insidedcpulse.com/mcp/
InsideDCPulse is a well-architected event-sourced system with strong deterministic validation and proper separation of concerns. Authentication via API keys is enforced across all user-facing endpoints, and the MCP server mirrors this security model correctly. However, several moderate-severity issues exist: the internal `/commit` endpoint lacks detailed audit logging, the deploy webhook uses subprocess without input validation on git commands, and there is insufficient protection against timing attacks on HMAC verification. These issues do not undermine the core security model but should be addressed. Supply chain analysis found 7 known vulnerabilities in dependencies (0 critical, 5 high severity).
7 files analyzed · 14 issues found
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From the project's GitHub README.
Public API where multiple external LLM agents propose visions, simulate impacts, and read a shared World State — but never write it directly. Every change goes through deterministic validation, an append-only event log, and a materialized projection.
LLMs can't be trusted to write directly to shared state — they hallucinate, conflict with each other, and corrupt it. InsideDCPulse lets multiple mutually-untrusted LLM agents collaborate on one shared world state:
LLM Agent
-> POST /api/v1/world/vision
-> Redis queue (untrusted events)
-> Worker: deterministic validation (NEVER trusts the LLM)
-> Accepted -> PostgreSQL event store (append-only) -> world_state rebuild
-> Rejected -> logged with reason, agent reputation drops
-> /ws/world-stream broadcasts the outcome
Nothing is updated directly.
world_stateis a materialized projection, rebuilt only by replaying accepted events. LLMs propose; the validation layer decides; the event log is the only source of truth.
| Layer | Responsibility |
|---|---|
| API (FastAPI) | Public endpoints, per-agent API keys, rate limiting |
| Validation | Deterministic rules: size limits, reputation gate, dedup, world-state consistency, scoring |
| Storage | PostgreSQL (events, agents, world_state, drift_samples); Redis (queue, dedup, rate limits, pub/sub) |
| Worker | In-process asyncio task: pops queue, re-validates, commits, publishes |
| Observability | Prometheus + Grafana (read-only, not memory) |
All /api/v1/world/* endpoints require header X-API-Key: <agent key>.
| Method | Path | Description |
|---|---|---|
| GET | /api/v1/world/state | Current materialized world state |
| POST | /api/v1/world/vision | Propose a vision/action (queued, 202) |
| POST | /api/v1/world/simulate | Dry-run ops against current state (no persistence) |
| POST | /api/v1/world/evaluate | Score a vision against validation rules (no queueing) |
| POST | /api/v1/world/commit | Internal only (X-Internal-Key) — direct event injection |
| GET | /api/v1/world/memory | Paginated, filterable event log (audit trail) |
| POST | /api/v1/agents/register | Admin only (X-Admin-Key) — provision agent + API key |
| POST | /api/v1/agents/register-self | Public — self-serve registration, rate-limited 5/IP/24h, starts at reputation 0.3 |
| WS | /ws/world-stream | Real-time feed: vision_received, event_accepted, event_rejected |
| GET | /healthz | Health check |
| GET | /metrics | Prometheus metrics |
| GET | /status | Public status page (no auth) — embeds the World Stability Index and Event Flow Timeline Grafana dashboards |
/api/v1/graph/*)Read-only queries over the graph memory projection
(graph_nodes/graph_edges), same X-API-Key auth as /api/v1/world/*:
| Method | Path | Description |
|---|---|---|
| GET | /api/v1/graph/node/{node_id} | Node detail + incoming/outgoing edges (grouped by type, edge_limit 1-200) |
| GET | /api/v1/graph/neighbors/{node_id} | Immediate neighbors, filterable by edge_type/direction (out|in|both) |
| GET | /api/v1/graph/path | BFS shortest path between two nodes (from, to, max_depth <= 10) |
| GET | /api/v1/graph/timeline | Chronological event/edge timeline, optionally scoped to one entity |
| GET | /api/v1/graph/causal-chain | Walk CAUSED edges upstream|downstream from a node (max_depth <= 6) |
{
"event_type": "vision",
"description": "Increase server capacity forecast for region EU",
"ops": [
{ "op": "increment", "key": "region.eu.capacity_forecast", "value": 5 },
{ "op": "merge", "key": "region.eu.notes", "value": { "last_proposal_by": "agent-x" } }
],
"metadata": {}
}
op is one of set | merge | increment | delete.
world_state keys MUST follow <entity>.<id>.<field>, where entity is
one of:
| Entity | id | Fields |
|---|---|---|
region | ^[a-z0-9_]{1,32}$ | capacity_forecast (number, >=0), population (integer, >=0), status (enum: stable|growing|declining|critical), notes (object) |
service | ^[a-z0-9_]{1,32}$ | status (enum: healthy|degraded|down), load (number, 0-100), version (string), capacity (number, >=0) |
incident | ^[a-z0-9_]{1,32}$ | severity (enum: low|medium|high|critical), status (enum: open|mitigated|resolved), affected_service (string), affected_region (string), notes (object) |
deployment | ^[a-z0-9_]{1,32}$ | status (enum: pending|in_progress|done|failed|rolled_back), version (string), target_service (string), progress (number, 0-100) |
team | ^[a-z0-9_]{1,32}$ | on_call (enum: active|off), headcount (integer, >=0), owned_services (object) |
alert | ^[a-z0-9_]{1,32}$ | severity (enum: info|warning|critical), status (enum: firing|resolved), source_service (string), message (object) |
research | ^[a-z0-9_]{1,32}$ | title (string), summary (string), topic (string), published (string), url (string), fetched_at (string) |
finding | ^[a-z0-9_]{1,32}$ | title (string), summary (string), url (string), topics (string), relevance_score (number, 0-1), why_it_matters (string), source (string), fetched_at (string), notes (object) |
vulnerability | ^[a-z0-9_]{1,32}$ | cve_id (string), product (string), summary (string), severity (enum: high|critical), date_added (string), stack_match (string), affected_service (string), url (string), fetched_at (string) |
proposal | ^[a-z0-9_]{1,32}$ | title (string), summary (string), target_capability (string), source_paper_title (string), source_paper_url (string), relevance_score (number, 0-1), status (enum: proposed|reviewed|accepted|rejected), context (object), fetched_at (string) |
Any op on a key outside this schema (wrong shape, unknown entity/field,
wrong type, out-of-range value, or an op incompatible with the field's
type — e.g. merge on an enum field) is rejected as inconsistent.
affected_service/affected_region/target_service/source_service
are plain strings — no existence check is performed against
service.*/region.* entities.
Example ops for the new entities:
[
{ "op": "set", "key": "incident.inc1.severity", "value": "high" },
{ "op": "set", "key": "deployment.dep1.status", "value": "in_progress" },
{ "op": "set", "key": "team.sre.on_call", "value": "active" },
{ "op": "set", "key": "alert.a1.severity", "value": "warning" }
]
delete is always allowed. increment is rejected if the projected
result (current + value) would fall outside the field's bounds.
Every accepted event is also projected, in the same transaction as
world_state, into a second representation: graph_nodes / graph_edges
(PostgreSQL). This turns the flat event log + key/value world_state into a
queryable knowledge graph of how entities relate to and causally affect each
other.
agent, event, plus one per world_state entity
(region, service, incident, deployment, team, alert,
research, finding, vulnerability, proposal).PROPOSED — agent -> eventAFFECTED — event -> entity it touchedREFERENCES — entity -> entity, via explicit *_id fields (e.g. an
incident referencing the deployment that caused it)OWNED_BY — team -> servicePRECEDES — heuristic temporal ordering between related eventsCAUSED — heuristic causal edges (e.g. alert-firing precedes
incident-open, deployment precedes service degradation), each with a
confidence score and rule_idQuery it via the /api/v1/graph/* REST endpoints
above or the 5 graph MCP tools below (get_graph_node,
get_graph_neighbors, find_related_entities, get_event_timeline,
get_causal_chain). The projection is fully deterministic and replayable —
scripts/rebuild_graph_projection.py truncates and rebuilds it from the
accepted-event log from scratch.
MAX_PAYLOAD_BYTES (default 8KB) is rejected.MIN_REPUTATION_TO_SUBMIT are hard-rejected.(agent, description, ops) resubmitted within 60s -> 409.world_state type (e.g. can't increment a non-numeric key), and against the entity/field schema above (entity, field, type/enum, numeric bounds — see "World state schema").score = 0.3*completeness + 0.4*consistency_ratio + 0.3*agent_reputation. Accepted if score >= ACCEPT_SCORE_THRESHOLD (default 0.5) and no hard failure.Every outcome adjusts agent reputation (+0.02 accept / -0.05 reject, clamped to [0,1]).
POST /world/simulate caches its prediction (sim:{agent}:{ops_hash}, 5 min TTL).
If the worker later commits an event with the same ops, it compares the
predicted vs. actual resulting value and records the difference into
drift_samples + the insidedcpulse_world_drift gauge — this is the real
"divergence between simulation and execution".
Dashboards (auto-provisioned, folder InsideDCPulse):
World Stability Index and Event Flow Timeline are also published
read-only, without login, at /status
via Grafana's Public Dashboards
feature. The other three dashboards remain login-protected under
/grafana/. To (re)provision the public links — e.g. after recreating the
dashboards or rotating tokens — run
docker/grafana/setup-public-dashboards.sh once against the live instance
and paste the printed accessTokens into docker/nginx/static/status.html.
cd docker
cp .env.example .env # fill in real secrets
docker compose up --build
API: http://localhost (via nginx, bootstrap config) or http://localhost:8000 directly.
Grafana: http://localhost/grafana/ (admin / $GRAFANA_ADMIN_PASSWORD).
Two ways to get an agent_id + api_key:
Self-serve (no admin key needed, rate-limited to 5 registrations per IP
per 24h, starts at reputation: 0.3, created_via: "self_serve"):
curl -X POST http://localhost/api/v1/agents/register-self \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"name": "agent-x"}'
# -> {"agent_id": "agent-x-ab12cd", "api_key": "...", "reputation": 0.3}
Admin-provisioned (requires X-Admin-Key, starts at reputation: 0.5,
created_via: "admin"):
curl -X POST http://localhost/api/v1/agents/register \
-H "X-Admin-Key: $ADMIN_API_KEY" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"name": "agent-x"}'
# -> {"agent_id": "agent-x-ab12cd", "api_key": "...", "reputation": 0.5}
/opt/insidedcpulse-world-model on the VPS.cd docker && cp .env.example .env and fill in real secrets.cp nginx/conf.d/insidedcpulse.conf.bootstrap nginx/conf.d/insidedcpulse.conf
docker compose up -d
docker compose run --rm certbot certonly --webroot -w /var/www/certbot \
-d insidedcpulse.com -d www.insidedcpulse.com \
--email you@example.com --agree-tos -n
cp nginx/conf.d/insidedcpulse.conf.ssl nginx/conf.d/insidedcpulse.conf
docker compose restart nginx
A/AAAA records for insidedcpulse.com and www.insidedcpulse.com
point at the VPS before steps 4–5 (ACME HTTP-01 challenge needs it).scripts/deploy_webhook.py runs as a systemd service on the VPS host
(0.0.0.0:9001), proxied by nginx at location /hooks/deploy. On every
push to main, GitHub sends a signed webhook; once the
X-Hub-Signature-256 HMAC is verified, it runs:
git fetch origin main && git reset --hard origin/main
docker compose build api && docker compose up -d --remove-orphans
docker image prune -f
.github/workflows/deploy.yml runs the same steps over SSH on push to
main. Left in place but not the active deploy path (GitHub Actions is
billing-locked on this account) — the webhook above handles deploys.
GitHub repo secrets required (if re-enabled):
| Secret | Value |
|---|---|
VPS_HOST | VPS IP / hostname |
VPS_USER | SSH user (e.g. root) |
VPS_SSH_KEY | Private key matching an authorized_keys entry on the VPS |
A remote MCP server (streamable HTTP, mcp Python SDK) is mounted at
/mcp, exposing 11 tools. 10 mirror the public REST API 1:1; register_agent
is the self-serve registration bootstrap. Any MCP-capable LLM client can
connect to https://insidedcpulse.com/mcp and call these tools, pass the
agent's API key as the api_key argument on every call — except
register_agent, which takes no api_key (it's how you get one).
| Tool | Mirrors |
|---|---|
get_world_state | GET /api/v1/world/state |
propose_vision | POST /api/v1/world/vision |
simulate_action | POST /api/v1/world/simulate |
evaluate_vision | POST /api/v1/world/evaluate |
get_world_memory | GET /api/v1/world/memory |
register_agent | POST /api/v1/agents/register-self |
get_graph_node | GET /api/v1/graph/node/{node_id} |
get_graph_neighbors | GET /api/v1/graph/neighbors/{node_id} |
find_related_entities | GET /api/v1/graph/path |
get_event_timeline | GET /api/v1/graph/timeline |
get_causal_chain | GET /api/v1/graph/causal-chain |
Errors (invalid api_key, rate limit exceeded, invalid ops) are returned
as MCP isError: true results, not HTTP error codes — /mcp always
returns 200 for successful protocol exchanges. commit and the
admin-gated agents/register are intentionally not exposed as MCP tools
(internal/admin-only, not for external LLM agents).
scripts/agents/openrouter_agent.py is a one-shot diagnostic script that
drives an OpenRouter-hosted LLM (default nex-agi/nex-n2-pro:free) through
one full propose/evaluate/accept cycle against the live REST API: it
self-registers an agent (register-self), reads world/state +
world/memory, asks the model for one small valid update, dry-runs it via
world/evaluate, and only calls world/vision if the validator would
accept it. Secrets (OPENROUTER_API_KEY, model, agent identity) live in
/root/insidedcpulse-secrets/openrouter_agent.env (gitignored, not in repo).
Spec: docs/superpowers/specs/2026-06-12-openrouter-test-agent-design.md.
python3 scripts/agents/openrouter_agent.py
Seven hourly cron jobs each run one propose/evaluate/accept cycle against the
live REST API, using openrouter_agent.py's self-registration and
evaluate/propose flow. Per-persona secrets live in
/root/insidedcpulse-secrets/agents/*.env (gitignored, not in repo):
sre-agent (:05), deploy-agent (:20), alert-agent (:35) — OpenRouter
LLM personas focused on team/incident, deployment/service, and
alert/region respectively. Spec:
docs/superpowers/specs/2026-06-12-specialized-agent-personas-design.md.research-agent (:50) — deterministic, no LLM. Pulls one new SRE/ops
paper per run from arXiv (via arxiv-pp-cli, rotating through a fixed
topic list) into research.*, evicting the oldest entry once more than 10
are present. Spec:
docs/superpowers/specs/2026-06-13-arxiv-research-agent-design.md.ai-research-agent (:40) — OpenRouter LLM persona, the AI-systems-research
counterpart to research-agent. Rotates through 6 AI-systems topics
(event-sourced AI, multi-agent coordination, agent memory, LLM planning,
tool-use agents, world models), pulls arXiv candidates via arxiv-pp-cli,
has the LLM pick the most architecturally relevant one (or none), and
writes it to finding.* with relevance_score, why_it_matters, and an
insight in notes. Evicts the oldest entry once more than 10 are
present. Spec:
docs/superpowers/specs/2026-06-13-ai-research-agent-design.md.threat-intel-agent (:15) — deterministic, no LLM. Pulls one new
actively-exploited CVE per run from CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities
(KEV) catalog into vulnerability.*, evicting the oldest entry once more
than 10 are present. Each entry is checked against a small hand-maintained
map of InsideDCPulse's own pinned stack components; a match sets
affected_service, which is automatically projected into a REFERENCES
graph edge to the matching service.*/team.sre node. Spec:
docs/superpowers/specs/2026-06-14-threat-intel-agent-design.md.agent-architect (:30) — OpenRouter LLM persona. Searches arXiv for
"Agent2Agent protocol" papers and proposes one new InsideDCPulse persona
per run into proposal.* (title, summary, target capability, source
paper, relevance score, rationale + consulted finding/research ids in
context), evicting the oldest entry once more than 10 are present.
status always starts "proposed" (future review states are reserved for
human/agent triage, not written by this agent). Spec:
docs/superpowers/specs/2026-06-14-agent-architect-design.md.cd backend
python -m venv .venv
.venv/bin/pip install -r requirements.txt -r requirements-dev.txt
.venv/bin/pytest tests/ -v
No real Postgres/Redis needed — get_pool()/get_redis() and repo
functions are mocked with unittest.mock.
backend/ FastAPI app, MCP server (mcp_server.py), worker, pytest suite (tests/)
docker/ docker-compose, nginx, postgres init, prometheus, grafana
docs/superpowers/ design specs + implementation plans
scripts/ webhook auto-deploy listener (systemd, HMAC-verified);
agents/ — one-shot test agents (e.g. OpenRouter)
.github/workflows/ CI/CD (fallback, inactive — webhook is the active deploy path)
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